Despite compelling theoretical arguments, existing research has so far failed to provide conclusive empirical evidence on the relationship between preferences for redistribution and attitudes towards immigration. We argue that social scientists risk making erroneous inferences if the causal link connecting an independent variable to a given output is not carefully modelled. This is particularly true in the presence of multiple and partly offsetting intervening variables. We argue that there are at least four motivations linking attitudes towards redistribution and preferred levels of immigration. We observe a statistically significant association between attitudes towards redistribution and preferred levels of immigration, but only after the motivations have been explicitly integrated into the empirical analysis. If the motivations are not explicitly modelled, no systematic relationship between attitudes towards redistribution and preferred levels of immigration can be observed.
Introduction
The relationship between immigration and redistribution is arguably one of the most The literature on why immigration might undermine support for redistribution starts from the observation that when there are significant numbers of minorities among the poor, the majority population can be roused against redistributing resources from the majority population to these minorities (Alesina and Glaeser 2004: 134) . This phenomenon is often explained by economic self-interest. 1 Van Oorschot and Uunk (2007: 65) summarize the literature on the relationship between immigration and redistribution as follows: "Hostile attitudes between members of two racial or ethnic groups reflect an underlying clash of personal self-interests. Individuals develop negative attitudes towards individuals with whom they are in direct competition." Sides and Citrin (2007: 478) add, "in interest-based theories of immigration, ethnic competition over scarce resources is the motivational basis of opposition to immigration". Similarly, Crepaz and Damron (2009: 439) argue, "welfare chauvinism is connected to the competition over scarce resources".
Interest-based arguments have important implications for the relationship between attitudes towards redistribution and preferred levels of immigration. If self-interest drives individuals'
support for redistribution, we should be able to find a negative relationship between preferences for redistribution and preferred levels of immigration given the generally lower socio-economic status of recent immigrants (Morissens and Sainsbury 2005) . However, existing research has so far failed to provide conclusive empirical evidence that documents this negative relationship (cf. Nannestad 2007; van Oorschot and Uunk 2007) . How can this null finding be explained?
Taking the research on support for redistribution as a starting point, we find the strong emphasis on economic self-interest somewhat puzzling. Although self-interest plays an important role in this literature, research on support for redistribution normally allows for socio-economic preferences other than self-interest (cf. van Oorschot 2000; Feldman and Steenbergen 2001; Meier Jaeger 2006) . Preferences are here understood as the choices people make in presence of trade-offs between different collections of things they value. Following Camerer and Fehr (2009: 55, emphasis in the original), we use the term 'social preferences' to refer to "how people rank different allocations of material payoffs to themselves and others."
In contrast, the term 'self-interested' refers to people who do not care about the outcomes of others.
In their field-defining research, the experimental economists around Fehr identify four main socio-economic preferences, which they refer to as 'self-interest', 'strong reciprocity', 'inequity aversion' and 'unconditional altruism' (Fehr and Gächter 2000; Fehr and Fischbacher 2005; Camerer and Fehr 2006) . In political science, the latter two are better known under the labels 'egalitarianism ' and 'humanitarianism' (cf. Feldman and Steenbergen 2001) . 2 This multitude of socio-economic preferences creates serious problems for empirical research on the relationship between immigration and redistribution. If economic self-interest is not the only motivation moderating the relationship between support for redistribution and preferred levels of immigration, then we risk making erroneous inferences because some of these motivations might offset each other at the aggregate level.
Elster (2007) Freeman (1986) . According to Razin et al. (2002 ), Hansen (2003 , Nannestad (2007) and Finseraas (2008) et al. 1986; Rabin 1993; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Fehr and Gächter 2000; Fischbacher 2003, 2005; Camerer and Fehr 2006) . As Fehr and Fischbacher (2005: 151) write, "during the previous decades, experimental psychologists and economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests that a substantial fraction of the people demonstrate social motives in their preferences". They refer to these other-regarding preferences as social preferences because "individuals who exhibit them behave as if they value the payoff of relevant reference agents positively or negatively" (Fehr and Fischbacher 2005: 151) . The most important social preferences are strong reciprocity, inequity aversion and unconditional altruism. The latter two are better known in political science under the labels 'egalitarianism' and 'humanitarianism' (cf. Feldman and Steenbergen 2001) . These social preferences stand in stark contrast to self-interested preferences, which are characterized by a general disregard for the outcomes of others.
In the following, we discuss how these four motivations moderate the relationship between support for redistribution and support for immigration. For reasons of space, this discussion is quite brief. More detailed discussions can be found elsewhere (Feldman and Steenbergen 2001; Fehr and Fischbacher 2005; Emmenegger and Klemmensen 2012) . However, before we present the four motivations, a word of caution is in order: As we do not want to make claims about the direction of causality, we are not arguing that attitudes towards redistribution cause attitudes towards immigration or vice versa. We simply argue that attitudes towards redistribution and attitudes towards immigration interact in a systematic way.
Let us start with self-interest. From a self-interested point of view, there are good reasons to observe a tension between redistribution and immigration. Self-interested individuals are expected to support redistribution if they are likely to be the main beneficiaries (Meier Jaeger 2006: 322-323) . Immigration, by contrast, hurts their interests because immigration is likely to redirect redistribution from natives to newly-arrived immigrants. The reason is simple:
Since newly arrived immigrants are likely to be poorer and more needy than resident natives, some natives may even become net contributors rather than net beneficiaries of redistribution.
Thus, if they support redistribution because of self-interest, they cannot be expected to support immigration because immigration is likely to increase competition for scarce resources (Razin et al. 2002; Hansen 2003; Nannestad 2007) . This leads us to our first hypothesis:
H1: The positive (negative) effect of support for redistribution on opposition to liberal immigration policies increases (decreases) with the level of self-interest of the respondents.
Egalitarianism (inequity aversion) links attitudes towards redistribution and immigration in a completely different way (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Feldman and Steenbergen 2001) .
Egalitarians want to achieve a more equitable distribution of economic resources through government intervention and redistribution. In more practical terms, this means that egalitarians want to increase (decrease) other persons' economic payoff if the other persons' economic payoffs are below (above) an equitable benchmark, for instance through the redistribution of incomes (Fehr and Fischbacher 2005: 153) . Although egalitarianism does not necessarily extend to immigrants (cf. Miller 1995), we follow Myrdal (1960) in conceptualizing (and operationalizing) egalitarianism as a behavioural propensity that considers the living conditions of immigrants. It could certainly be argued that some egalitarians might oppose immigration because the immigration of low-skilled workers might lower low-skilled wages due to a higher supply of low-skilled labour. However, in the context of this analysis, a conceptualization of egalitarianism that extends to immigrants is more relevant. 3 Hence, given that immigrants tend to be needy, egalitarians, as conceptualized and operationalized here, are unlikely to observe a tension between redistribution and immigration. Rather, they can be expected to support redistribution to the benefit of immigrants. This leads us to our second hypothesis:
H2: The positive (negative) effect of support for redistribution on opposition to liberal immigration policies decreases (increases) with the level of egalitarianism of the respondents.
Strong reciprocity is another motivation that might moderate the relationship between attitudes towards redistribution and immigration (Fehr and Fischbacher 2005; Fong et al. 2005) . A strongly reciprocal individual responds to actions as a function of perceived intentions motivating this action and the legitimacy of someone's claims. If an action or a claim is considered 'fair' or 'legitimate', strongly reciprocal individuals respond with cooperation, otherwise they punish even at personal cost. The prevalence of strong reciprocity has been demonstrated in experiments using anonymous one-shot interactions. In so-called ultimatum games, a proposer is instructed to offer a share of a sum known to both players.
The recipient can either accept or reject the proposal. If the recipient accepts, the participants receive the money as allocated by the proposer. If the recipient rejects, the participants receive nothing. If self-interest motivates both proposer and recipient, the proposer would offer only a very small share to the recipient. The recipient, on the other hand, would accept any offer larger than zero because any such offer would make the recipient better off financially. In reality, however, proposers tend to offer more money than the bare minimum, while recipients tend to reject low offers even though these offers are considerably higher than the possible minimum offer. The reason for this behaviour is, according to Fehr and Fischbacher (2005) , that recipients consider low offers to be unfair and are willing to accept costs (the foregone benefit) if this allows them to punish the proposer. (Fehr and Fischbacher 2005: 154) .
Humanitarianism is qualitatively different from egalitarianism. As Feldman and Steenbergen (2001) note, humanitarians want to help those in need, but they do not necessarily support extensive state intervention and widespread redistribution. Humanitarianism is likely to influence attitudes towards immigration (because they consider immigrants to be in need of help), but humanitarianism has no effect on support for redistribution. As argued by Feldman and Steenbergen (2001: 661, emphasis in the original), humanitarianism generates "support for a much more limited set of policies, namely policies that redress immediate needs that arise in limited sections of the population". As a result, humanitarians do not perceive a tension between redistribution and immigration because they do not see the two as related.
This leads us to our fourth hypothesis:
H4: The positive (negative) effect of support for redistribution on opposition to liberal immigration policies is unaffected by the level of humanitarianism of the respondents.
In sum, we argue that at least four interaction effects need to be explicitly modelled when we analyse the relationship between attitudes towards redistribution and immigration. All four socio-economic preferences can be observed at the same time within a given electorate (Fehr and Fischbacher 2005; Emmenegger and Klemmensen 2012) . Individuals who support redistribution out of self-interest are likely to experience a tension between redistribution and immigration. So are strongly reciprocal individuals who question the motives and intentions of the majority of immigrants. In contrast, egalitarians experience no tension between redistribution and immigration, but support both. Finally, humanitarians want to help immigrants, but as their humanitarianism does not affect their attitudes towards redistribution, they do not experience a tension between redistribution and immigration.
Data and operationalization
In this section, we discuss the data sources, the operationalization of variables and the statistical approach. The present analysis uses the first wave of the European Social Survey We operationalize the dependent variable, preferred level of immigration, as suggested by Sides and Citrin (2007: 482-484) In the theoretical part, we argue that four socio-economic preferences -self-interest, strong reciprocity, humanitarianism and egalitarianism -moderate the relationship between attitudes towards redistribution and attitudes towards immigration. We measure self-interest with the following question: 'Please say how much you agree or disagree with the following statement: Average wages and salaries are generally brought down by people coming to live and work here.' Respondents were given five options, ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly).
We operationalize self-interest using an attitude question because the survey item allows for a direct comparison with the operationalizations of the three other-regarding socio-economic preferences, which we cannot operationalize using objective indicators given that these preferences consider the outcomes of others. Moreover, we believe that income is an unsuitable indicator of self-interest in the context of this analysis. While high-income earners are unlikely to compete with newly arrived immigrants over scarce resources, they are likely to be forced to contribute most of the funding. Hence, both high-and low-income earners have reason to experience a tension between redistribution and immigration (Hainsmueller and Hiscox 2010) . The former have reason to worry about the increasing extent of redistribution, while the latter need to worry about increased competition for scarce resources.
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Our operationalization of self-interest has several advantages: First, it clearly reflects our theoretical argument, which emphasizes competition for scarce resources between residents and newly arrived immigrants. Second, it identifies 'people coming to live and work here' as the source of this increased competition for scarce resources. Third, although the question refers to immigrants, it is primarily concerned with the negative consequences for residents (whose wages and salaries are brought down). Hence, it captures the respondents' self-interest and does not consider the consequences for immigrants. We acknowledge that some respondents might be interested in generally lower salaries (e.g. employers). We control for this possibility by presenting estimation results that restrict the sample to respondents in financial stress. Put differently, we restrict the sample to those who feel economically at risk to evaluate the moderating effect of self-interest.
We measure the three other-regarding socio-economic preferences using the following three survey questions. Egalitarianism is captured using the question: 'Please say how much you agree or disagree with the following statement: People who have to come to live here should be given the same rights as everyone else'. As in the case of self-interest, respondents were given five options, ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly). This question clearly captures the egalitarians' preference for equitable distribution of economic resources.
Strong reciprocity is captured using the question: 'Please say how much you agree or disagree with the following statement: Most applicants for refugee status aren't in real fear of persecution in their own countries.' Again, respondents were given five options, ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly). This question clearly refers to the perceived dishonest behaviour of (an important group of) immigrants. In the empirical analysis, we are primarily interested in how the four socio-economic preferences moderate the relationship between attitudes towards redistribution and preferred levels of immigration. For all these socio-economic preferences we have formulated different theoretical predictions. We expect self-interested and strongly reciprocal individuals to perceive a tension between redistribution and immigration, while we expect egalitarianism to attenuate this tension. Finally, we expect this tension to be unaffected by the level of humanitarianism. The bivariate correlations between the different 'motivations' are generally modest. Self-interest is positively correlated with strong reciprocity (0.22). All other bivariate correlations are below 0.20.
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We add a whole set of control variables to our regression models. First, we control for respondents' beliefs about the nation and its cultural make-up. We expect respondents with a strong sense of national identity and a preference for cultural unity to be more opposed to immigration (Sides and Citrin 2007: 480) . Second, we control for the comparative estimate of the level of immigration (more or less than other European countries of same size) and the difference between the actual share of foreign-born residents and the respondents' estimate to account for the fact that overestimates of minority populations are correlated with opposition to immigration (Sides and Citrin 2007: 480-481) . Third, we control for satisfaction with the economy and personal finances to account for the current economic situation of the respondent and the country. A negative assessment of the current economic situation and personal finances is likely to increase opposition to immigration. Finally, we add the standard control variables (age, education, employment status, gender, income) plus self-identification as member of a minority group. See appendix for documentation of the operationalization of the control variables.
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We estimate weighted OLS regressions with clustered standard errors and fixed effects.
Following Brambor et al. (2006) , we analyse interaction effects using graphical visualizations.
The models are estimated using Stata 11. Table 1 displays the results of our regression of preferred levels of immigration (high values indicating a preference for lower levels of immigration) on preferences for redistribution, the moderator variables and control variables. The control variables show the expected signs. In particular, we observe strong effects of variables capturing identity and information.
Empirical analysis
Therefore, we turn our attention to the independent variables of theoretical interest. Model 1 in Table 1 shows that there is no significant unconditional effect of attitudes towards redistribution on preferred levels of immigration. Thus, taken in isolation, Model 1 seems to show that there is no relationship between support for redistribution and preferred levels of immigration. However this conclusion changes once we take into account the moderator variables through which preferences for redistribution and preferred levels of immigration might be linked.
[ Table 1 ] Models 2 to 6 in Table 1 contain the four moderator variables (self-interest, strong reciprocity, egalitarianism and humanitarianism) with each interaction being tested separately. Finally, Models 7 and 8 in Table 1 contain the four moderator variables with interactions being tested simultaneously. As Table 1 shows, the addition of the four motivations and the four interaction terms leads to a dramatic increase in the explanatory power of our models. Wald tests show that the inclusion of the four moderator variables and the inclusion of the four interaction terms significantly improve the model fit. This finding provides strong evidence that attitudes towards redistribution and immigration interact in a systematic way. We therefore turn to a discussion of the conditional effects of preferences for redistribution on the preferred level of immigration.
Our main interest lies in the relationship between redistribution preferences and attitudes towards immigration and how this relationship is moderated by the four motivations discussed in the theoretical part. As is well known, the constitutive terms of multiplicative interactions (shown in Table 1 ) should not be interpreted as if they are unconditional or average effects because the constitutive terms capture the marginal effects only when the moderator variable is zero (Brambor et al. 2006: 71-73) . Hence, these coefficients are substantively not meaningful. We therefore display the marginal effects graphically.
The five panels in Figure 1 (based on Models 2 to 6 in Table 1 ) and the five panels in Figure 2 (based on Models 7 and 8 in Table 1) Panel A1 in Figure 1 and Panel A2 in Figure 2 show that the marginal effect of preferences for redistribution increases with the level of self-interest. Put differently, the more respondents are self-interested (moving to the right on the x-axis), the higher the marginal effect of preferences for redistribution on preferred levels of immigration. However, somewhat surprisingly, the marginal effects are never significantly different from zero. This changes as soon as we restrict the sample to respondents in financial stress. 9 Panels B1 and B2 demonstrate that self-interest can explain whether respondents in financial stress experience a tension between redistribution and immigration. The marginal effects are significantly different from zero for respondents characterized by low levels of self-interest.
Hence, among those economically at risk, opposition to immigration increases with selfinterest.
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A different moderating effect can be observed in Panel C1 in Figure 1 and Panel C2 in Figure   2 . These two panels show that egalitarian respondents do not experience a tension between redistribution and immigration. Quite the contrary, the more egalitarian the respondents are (moving to the right on the x-axis), the lower is the marginal effect of attitudes towards redistribution on preferences for lower levels of immigration. In both panels, the marginal effect turns significantly different from zero.
Panel D1 in Figure 1 and Panel D2 in Figure 2 display the marginal effect of preferences for redistribution on preferred levels of immigration conditional on the social preference 'strong reciprocity'. Panel D1 shows that the more strongly reciprocal respondents are (moving to the right on the x-axis), the stronger they prefer lower levels of immigration. This effect is significantly different from zero for respondents characterized by low levels of strong reciprocity. We thus find evidence of a moderating effect of the social preference strong reciprocity. However, as Panel D2 shows, the significant effect disappears once we include the other three moderator variables. 11 We speculate that this lack of robustness can be explained by multicollinearity. Among the four moderator variables, we observe the strongest bivariate correlation between self-interest and strong reciprocity (r p =0.22). Indeed, an analysis of variance inflation factors (VIF) shows that models 7 and 8 suffer from multicollinearity.
The VIF quantifies the extent to which multicollinearity inflates standard errors. In Models 7
and 8, the average VIF is 5.7, while the VIF for the interaction effect between preferences for redistribution and strong reciprocity approaches 20. In contrast, Models 1 to 6 in Table 1 have average variance inflation factors between 2.3 (Model 1) and 3.6 (Model 3), indicating low levels of multicollinearity. Thus, Models 7 and 8 in Table 1 are likely to overestimate the size of the standard errors of the variables of interest.
In the case of egalitarianism, self-interest and strong reciprocity, we expect to find significant marginal effects of preferences for redistribution on preferred levels of immigration conditional on the scores of the moderator variable. In contrast, we expect to find no such relationship in the case of humanitarianism. Indeed, as Panels E1 in Figure 1 and E2 in Figure   2 demonstrate, humanitarianism does not moderate the relationship between preferences for redistribution and attitudes towards immigration. If at all, it seems as if the perception of a tension between redistribution and immigration increases with the level of humanitarianism of the respondent (see Panel E2). This demonstrates that humanitarianism is qualitatively different from both egalitarianism and self-interest.
In sum, only when we model the four motivations explicitly do we observe a significant relationship between attitudes towards redistribution and preferred levels of immigration.
More concretely, we find significant effects of redistribution preferences on attitudes towards immigration conditional on the level of egalitarianism, self-interest and reciprocity. However, if we fail to open the black box, we cannot observe a significant relationship (see Model 1) and might be tempted to conclude that preferences for redistribution and attitudes towards immigration are not systematically related. However, such a conclusion would be premature.
Rather, the absence of a significant relationship in Model 1 is the result of the fact that the effects of the intervening variables 'self-interest' and 'strong reciprocity' are offset by the effects of the intervening variable 'egalitarianism'. If these effects are disentangled, the significant relationship becomes visible.
Conclusions
We have argued that we risk making erroneous inferences if we do not think carefully about the intervening variables that link an independent variable to a given outcome. Using the relationship between attitudes towards redistribution and preferred levels of immigration as our example, we show that if these intervening variables are not carefully modelled we risk accepting wrong hypotheses or discarding hypotheses that are probably true. We therefore argue that we need to be more attentive to the ways in which dependent and independent variables are linked. This insight is especially important in cases in which more than one intervening variable moderates the relationship between independent and dependent variables.
If these effects offset each other, we might be tempted to conclude that independent and dependent variables are not systematically related. However, the explicit modelling of the set of intervening variables could unearth the causal relationship.
Our empirical case, the relationship between redistribution and immigration, implies that scholars have underestimated the importance of the link between preferences for redistribution and attitudes towards immigration. This literature typically assumes that selfinterest is the only socio-economic preference that links attitudes towards redistribution to preferred levels of immigration. However, it is well established in the literature on welfare state support as well as experimental economics that other socio-economic preferences such as egalitarianism and strong reciprocity influence support for redistribution. If these multiple intervening variables have partly offsetting effects on the relationship between attitudes towards redistribution and preferred levels of immigration, researchers might be tempted to reject a systematic relationship between these two variables. However, an explicit modelling of these interaction effects would have uncovered the true magnitude of the relationship.
In our statistical analysis, we have first demonstrated the absence of a significant relationship between preferences for redistribution and preferred levels of immigration -despite compelling theoretical reasons to think otherwise. However, once we have incorporated the intervening variables expected to moderate the relationship between preferences for redistribution and preferred levels of immigration, we were able to find significant and substantively important effects. Hence, we have found that among those who feel economically at risk self-interested respondents indeed experience a tension between immigration and redistribution. However, this relationship becomes visible only once we disentangle the effect of self-interest from the effects of egalitarianism, humanitarianism and strong reciprocity.
We were able to observe these significant effects of preferences for redistribution on preferred levels of immigration despite admittedly somewhat rudimentary measures of the four moderator variables. We are confident that more sophisticated operationalizations would unearth even stronger effects. In particular, laboratory experiments could prove to be useful in assessing the level of egalitarianism, humanitarianism, self-interest and strong reciprocity, before the participants' preferences for redistribution and preferred levels of immigration are surveyed.
Endnotes:
1 Existing research does not only focus on interest-based theories. Scholars also emphasize the role of identities and information. Although we acknowledge the role of identities and information, this article focuses on the role of socio-economic motivations. However, we control in the empirical analysis for the role of identities and information through a battery of control variables.
2 We are using the terms inequity aversion and egalitarianism and the terms unconditional altruism and humanitarianism interchangeably. 3 We refrain from considering both conceptualizations of egalitarianism in the statistical analysis because both conceptualizations would necessarily rely on similar operationalizations. In addition, the inclusion of both conceptualizations would blur the distinction between egalitarianism and self-interest in the context of this analysis because the likelihood of being a beneficiary of egalitarian policies increases with restrictive immigration policies. 4 We arrive at similar conclusions using alternative operationalizations such as unemployment, the importance of supporting those worse off or the perceived consequences of immigration for the economic prospects of the poor. Results are available upon request. We prefer our indicator of self-interest to these alternative operationalizations for a series of reasons: Unemployment is a dummy variable, the importance of supporting those worse off comes dangerously close to the standard operationalization of humanitarianism (importance of helping others), while the perceived economic consequences for the poor is only relevant for self-interested poor respondents. While we expect self-interest, strong reciprocity and egalitarianism to moderate the relationship between preferences for redistribution and preferred levels of immigration, humanitarianism is not expected to have a moderating effect. 8 We thank John Sides and Jack Citrin for their support in the development of the statistical model.
9 This is not true when all control variables used in Sides and Citrin (2007) are included. This
should not come as a surprise though. Using the full set of control variables leads to severe problems of multicollinearity as several independent variables reach variance inflation factors of up to 20, including the independent variables of interest. In particular, some of the control variables used by Sides and Citrin (such as trust or conservatism) strongly correlate with some of our independent variables of interest (e.g. political ideology is likely to influence perceptions of immigrants' intentions). We have therefore decided to present in the paper estimations based on a smaller set of control variables. 10 The fact that opposition to immigration increases with self-interest in particular among those economically at risk lends support to recent findings by Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) who have found that opposition to immigration is more strongly related to fears of welfare competition than to fears of increasing taxes. 
